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The Given and a Proximity to Art: 
Heidegger’s Early Dialectical Conception of Phenomenology  
In the summer semester of 1919/20 Heidegger invokes various senses of ‘dialectics.’ The 
signals he sends are not mixed, but they are highly differentiated, identifying negative and 
positive senses of ‘dialectic.’  Thanks to this discussion, he identifies a phenomenologically 
acceptable conception of the given and how it relates to a fundamental dialectical problem for 
phenomenology. Precisely in this connection, he also notes how phenomenology, in giving 
shape to what is seen, enters into “close relationship” to art (GA 58: 255).  The aim of the 
following remarks is to demonstrate Heidegger’s dialectical conception of phenomenology, 
primarily as it bears on his early views on the concept of the given and the artistic dimension of 
phenomenology.  
 
1 
 
I start with the topic of dialectic in Heidegger’s critical discussion of the problem of givenness 
in Marburg and the Southwest schools of Neo-Kantianism, in both of which Heidegger sees a 
return to Hegel. In this discussion Heidegger differentiates what is seen, given, and expressed 
in phenomenology.  What phenomenology sees is something normally unseen and implicit (a 
point iterated at the outset of Sein und Zeit). What is “phenomenologically given” is, 
accordingly, not what is first found (Vorgefundenes) but what phenomenology brings into view 
and sets into relief (GA 58: 218).   
 
In an earlier lecture, Heidegger cited the lectern in the lecture hall as something he encountered.  
It is presumably an example of something first found, as is the lived experience of it (walking 
towards it, placing his notes on it, standing next to it, and so on). By no means does it first arise 
by being expressed. Phenomenology brings what it finds (e.g., implicit meanings, that of the 
lectern and the experience of it) to relief by singling it out, displaying it, writing it down, and 
the like.  In other words, phenomenology takes what it finds and makes it explicit by expressing 
it, albeit with the important proviso that what is expressed is not in its specific context 
invariably the correlate of knowing.   
 
Heidegger adds, however, that, just as we need to avoid re-interpreting as a phenomenological 
given what phenomenology first finds (or, as he soon puts it, what the phenomenologist has 
before her, the Vorhabe), so, too, we need to refrain from conflating – at least in a certain sense 
– phenomenological givens with the expressions of them.  See P1 
 
Phenomenological givennesses that we set into relief should not be re- 
P1 interpreted into expressions, as though they would have first arisen by virtue of 
the fact that someone expresses them.  (GA 58: 219) 
 
What is first found is not to be confused with the product or result of a phenomenological 
attitude, what is given and expressed in that attitude. As he puts it earlier in his lectures (with 
perhaps a superfluous air of paradox), phenomenology’s givennesses are “never and nowhere” 
given (GA 58: 26f).  So, too, the actual domain of objects of philosophy (as phenomenology) is 
not given in advance (GA 58: 29). 
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In his criticisms of Natorp’s and Rickert’s approaches to givenness, Heidegger notes that in life 
we can be directed at something without it standing opposite us with the character of givenness 
(again, consider the example of the lectern).  Indeed, things are not immediately given in a 
factical sense at all. And we would never come to have the basic experience that we 
respectively have of our worlds, an experience of meaningfulness, through the idea of the 
experience of a thing, as the Neo-Kantians suppose (GA 58: 223-24). See P2 
 
The factical experience of life is absorbed in contexts of meaningfulness.  
Existence without meaningfulness has no possibility of motivating at all. 
P2  Existence as what is “fully determined,” in which “nothing is undetermined” 
(i.e., existence in the sense of the existential judgment, such as the Marburg 
School understands it) can never surface in factical life.  (GA 58: 217)   
 
After criticizing the Marburg School for the pretension of supposing an endless determination 
of the given through thinking alone, Heidegger notes the clear echoes to Hegel’s  
construal of the “absolute power of thinking” (GA 58: 225).  He then issues a scathing criticism 
of dialectics (at least of a certain sort), see P3 
 
The dialectic is blind to the givenness.  The idea of the dialectic is   
P3 fundamentally perverse.  It rests upon a confusion between grasping an object 
and expression, between intuition and expression.  
   
In his notes, Heidegger distinguishes between two areas of problems: that of grasping what 
stands before us (Gegenstand, not Objekt!) and that of giving expression (and thereby logical 
determinateness) to what is grasped. Overlooking this distinction and constructing a theory of 
consciousness accordingly, he notes, are the source of the “basic mistake of all absolutizing of 
the dialectic” (GA 58: 133).  
 
2 
In the lectures, however, Heidegger deploys the term ‘dialectic’ in a positive sense as well. 
Experiences [Erlebnisse], he insists, are not things, but rather “forms of expression 
[Ausdrucksgestalten] of tendencies of concrete situations of life” (GA 58: 233).  A science of 
these experiences takes its start from the intuition of the context of the experience – the 
situations – from which the experiences arise. Aping Husserl, Heidegger adds that they are not 
just any intuitions, but instead intuitions that afford the contexts of experience in an originary 
way.  These intuitions are explicated in “pure understanding,” in the form of interpretations of 
contexts of meaning.  
 
Yet, the understanding in question here takes shape [sich ausformt], as already noted, in the 
interpretation of contexts of meaning.  In the final stage of this process, a specific connection 
presents itself, namely, the connection between the understanding and the construction of what 
ultimately dominates the situations of life.  Constantly in play at this juncture is what 
Heidegger dubs “the problem of the dialectic,” namely, the question of whether grasping or 
expression or even something else is in play. See P4  
 
 3 
In a similar vein, Heidegger notes the dialectical character of moving from intuition to 
expression.  In order to secure a foothold in the life experience under consideration, it is 
incumbent on the phenomenologist to “go along” with the experience, looking in advance, not 
primarily to things or objects, but to the situation of the experience, its motivations and 
tendencies, and the expressions of them (GA 58: 254-59).  
 
This [process] can only be implemented in the manner of an argumentation, to a  
P5 certain extent, dialectically.  We hit here upon the problem of the relationship of 
intuition, pure understanding, and the dialectical expression in concepts. (GA 
58: 255) 
 
In these passages (P4 and in P5), ‘dialectic’ stands for part of the process of phenomenological 
description, more specifically, the problem of giving it expression without conflating the 
expression with the intuition or understanding. The problem arises presumably from the fact 
that differentiating the intuition – particularly a “hermeneutic intuition” or “intuition that is part 
of understanding” (GA 56/57: 117, 219) – from the expression is obviously not transparent 
without further ado. 
 
Up to this point, the present section has been a gloss on passages in Becker’s transcript. In 
Heidegger’s notes, we find a slightly different conception. There he treats the intuition of 
experience and the grasp of it as the same, adding that the grasp of the experiences themselves, 
in their situational fullness, is the work of pure understanding.  Yet here, too, he speaks of the 
dialectical in a positive if underdetermined sense.  See P6 
  
The relation of the understanding – of relations of interpretation and 
construction in themselves and to one another; the [relation] to and through one 
another and not-without-one-another as dialectical in its relation to pure  
P6 understanding; originality and non-originality of the dialectical; the dialectical 
[dimension] of possible pure understanding (form of grasp) or simply form of 
expression, the originary and the ultimate [character] precisely of this relation of 
expression.  (GA 58: 138) 
 
Given the lack of complete sentences in this passage, interpreting its meaning is fraught.  
Nevertheless, certain aspects of his understanding of dialectics and the “dialectical” in a 
positive sense are clear.  It stands in close relation to the pure understanding of experiences, the 
very activity of the phenomenologist, consisting in both interpretation and – perhaps most 
notably – construction.  It operates, moreover, both on the level of understanding and its 
expression. 
    
3 
Throughout these lectures, Heidegger stresses that life is not an object.  Insofar as concepts are 
means of classifying objects, putting them in some sort of order (Ordnungsbegriffe), employed 
for the purpose of establishing universally valid propositions, they fail to be appropriate 
concepts of life.  To conceive life in terms of these sorts of concepts is to distort it in a quite 
specific manner (eine bestimmte Deformation).  By contrast, an understanding of life must pay 
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heed to the expressions of it.  This understanding, operating with concepts of expression 
(Ausdrucksbegriffe), does not lay claim to universally valid propositions.  
 
Heidegger notes how factical life constantly affords itself in this specifically distorted manner, 
limiting it to object-like formations (objektartige Ausformungen).  Because phenomenological 
descriptions must undo this process, they are replete with negations (“it is not this,” “it is not 
that”).  This reliance upon negation replicates, Heidegger observes, a basic move and 
motivation of Hegelian dialectics. 
 
Factical life affords itself in a specific deformation.  This refashioning of it into 
configurations of objects [Objektsgebilde] must be reversed. As a result, one is  
P7 constantly saying ‘not’ in the course of [giving] phenomenological descriptions. 
– This is the basic sense of the Hegelian method of dialectic (thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis). – By this means, negation acquires a creative force that is the driving 
force of concepts of expression in contrast to ordering concepts. (GA 58: 240)   
 
Heidegger exemplifies this last remark by applying phenomenology’s destructive character to 
the objective attitude of contemporary psychology.  This application, he observes, is to be 
understood “in the sense of the ‘dialectical’ method of negation, for which the first step is 
destructive” (GA 58: 241).  Thus, as in P4, Heidegger characterizes his phenomenological 
method as dialectical in certain respects. It is dialectical insofar as its first move is to rely upon 
a negation, i.e., the negation of the distorting objectification that is part and parcel of life.  In 
his notes Heidegger observes that this negative character – “the productivity of the not” – is the 
“sense of the Hegelian dialectic” (GA 58: 148).  But Heidegger’s phenomenological method is 
also dialectical insofar as its negation of classificatory concepts of objects aims at insuring that 
phenomenology’s concepts are concepts of expressions, expressions of meaning.  
 
Also echoing Hegel in theses lectures is Heidegger’s insistence that the key to understanding 
human life is the history of the human spirit (Geist).  Efforts in this direction are evident in 
history but they typically slide off course into objectifications.  For this reason, Heidegger 
advises, the history of philosophy in particular needs to be re-thought.  Instead of construing it 
as the genesis of objectifying sciences, the task is to investigate where it succeeds in expressing 
something original and where it then devolves into something objectifying.  This sort of history 
of the human spirit is “the true organon for understanding human life,” and herein lies, he adds, 
“the deeper sense of Hegel’s philosophy” (GA 58: 246).  
 
On the final pages of Becker’s transcript, Heidegger iterates a point that is by now familiar, 
namely, that philosophical concepts are not concepts of objects, though they have the formal 
function of determining, “determining through expression.” And Heidegger understands 
determining through expression as a dialectic, though not the sort of dialectic found in Hegel’s 
logic.   
The dialectic in philosophy, as the form of the expression, is not a dialectic in  
P8  the sense of the synthetic counter-positioning of concepts. A philosophical 
dialectic is instead a diahermeneutics.  
The phrase ‘dialectics as diahermeneutics’ signals a procedure of warding off (negating) 
objectifications of life and doing so through (διά) determining-and-conveying (ἑρµηνεία) life’s 
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meanings in its expressions.  To be sure, the hermeneutical phenomenologist thereby runs up 
against the dialectical problem flagged above, that of giving expression to the expressions of 
life, without merely iterating them, cataloguing them, or constructing a biography out of them.  
 
In this respect the artistic character of the phenomenology becomes apparent, if ‘artistic’ 
signals giving genuine expression to life in an innovative, creative, and constructive way. 
Throughout Heidegger’s early lectures, it bears noting, he regards art in a cognate way, namely, 
as a present or past pre-eminent expression of life, an “organ of understanding life.” To be sure, 
in these lectures Heidegger stresses that the “rigor of philosophical expression” 
(“concentrated,” as it is, “on the genuineness of life-relations in concrete living itself”) has its 
own standard of measure, distinct from that of art (GA 18: 231).  Nonetheless, he observes the 
proximity of his phenomenological method to art.  The observation comes as he identifies five 
steps of the phenomenological method: (1) referring to specific sphere of factical life; (2) 
participating in the experience (i.e., Mitmachen); (3) preemptively looking for the horizons, 
tendencies, and motives of the experience; (4) selectively articulating what is seen; (5) 
interpreting the phenomena.   He then cites the sixth step as follows: 
 
(6) Finally, what follows is actually giving shape to what has been seen  
P9   phenomenologically, the re-joining of the articuli [parts, segments] that have 
been torn apart. Here phenomenology enters into close relationship to art. (GA 
18: 255) 
 
Hermeneutical phenomenology is the art of giving shape to what has been analyzed, so that it 
becomes alive with the meaning that was hidden but operative in the lived experience itself.  
But precisely because it has been hidden and because its disclosure rides on the experience of 
interpreting it, creativity, innovation, and construction become indispensable.  The construction 
is not unconstrained, to be sure; the repeated appeals in Sein und Zeit to ontic and existentiel 
dimensions as means of corroborating the existential analysis illustrate the constraints.  But 
those constraints, while necessary, are not sufficient to dictate the expression.  As expressions 
of the phenomenological method, the terminology, the conceptual framework, the organization 
of the presentation – as in the existential analysis of Sein und Zeit – have been constructed.   
 
Conclusion 
The problem of dialectic is precisely that of negotiating interpretation and construction, 
understanding and expression.  Far from dismissing the problem, Heidegger acknowledges its 
continual presence as a fundamental dimension of hermeneutical phenomenology, the 
operative, constructive dimension where phenomenology enters into a “close relationship” to 
art.   If the foregoing exposition is on target, it may require some adjustment to how we read 
Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses in Sein und Zeit  and elsewhere.  But more important 
is the challenge that this understanding of phenomenology in proximity to art presents to us: 
can we interpret our lives and our worlds artfully, constructively, productively?	  
